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Additional Parties
Rex E. Davis was listed as a plaintiff on certain pleading captions below
and in the final order. He was not, however, named as a plaintiff in the complaint.
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Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), as this is an appeal from
a final district court order that was transferred to this Court from the Supreme Court.
Issues on Appeal
1.

The district court's order should be affirmed because the appellant has not

challenged either the controlling ruling in limine or the factual findings following trial.
2.

The district court's order should be affirmed because the appellant has

raised new issues on appeal that were not raised or preserved below.
3.

Assuming the appellant has properly raised and preserved his appellate

challenges, the district court's order should be affirmed because, as a matter of fact and
law, the grantors did not revoke the trust with respect to the farm.
Standards of Review
1.

Challenging rulings: To obtain appellate review of a district court ruling, a

party must raise and brief the issue specifically on appeal, or it is waived. See State v.
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, If 2, 40 P.3d 630; State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986);
Helper State Bank v. Crus, 81 P.2d 359, 362 (Utah 1938). To challenge factual findings,
an appellant has a duty to "marshal all of the facts used to support the trial court's finding
and then show that these facts cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial
court, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee." Wayment v.
Howard, 2006 UT 56, % 9, 144 P.3d 1147.
2.

New issues on appeal: Claims not raised in the district court may not be

raised for the first time on appeal. See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, If 26, 158 P.3d 540.
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A party must give the district court an opportunity to address the purported error or is
precluded from raising the issue on appeal. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^ 15, 127
P.3d 1256. For an issue addressed at trial, a timely and specific objection must be made
to preserve the issue for appeal. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,ffif14-15. 128 F i d
1171. This Court will not address assignments of error invited by the appellant below.
See id.
3.

Judgment following trial: A trial court's factual findings will not be

disturbed in iless 1:1 ley are si low i i by i i larshaling to be cleai ly ei i oneous. U.R.C.P. 52(a);
BluffdaleMt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, \ 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep. 41.
The application of law to facts found at trial is a mixed question of fact and law. See,
e.g., Waymeni v. Howard, 200' 7 t !1 56, ][ 9, I I = i P.3( I 11 t 7. I his C< >i u: t defersfc> th
district court's application of law to the facts, granting broad deference when the issue is
extremely fact dependent. See id. "In addition, when appealing a highly fact dependent
issue, tl le appellai it has a di it> to i i lai shal the evidence." Id. ' Fhe law applied is i eviewed
for correctness. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, Tf 11, 154 P.3d 808.
Issue Preservation
1.

C 'hi i llenging / n lings; Because tl le appellai it fails ii I tl lis appeal to challenge

the controlling ruling in limine and findings of fact, the appellee had no opportunity to
address such failure below.
2.

••" issues on appeal: Because the appellant raises new issues foi the first

time on appeal, the appellee had no opportunity to address such issues below.
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3.

Judgment following trial. Appellee preserved his arguments regarding the

proper disposition of the trust property in his pleadings, pretrial motions, and trial
arguments below. (R.l-7, 111-211, 318-36, 620-34, 663-70, 782-84.)
Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a district court order determining the proper title to real
property held in a family trust. The court determined that a recorded quitclaim deed,
unsupported by any consideration and lacking the valid signatures of both trustors, did
not revoke the trust with respect to farm property identified in the deed. (R.739-40;
Aplee. Addend. Ex. 1.) The court further found, based on the evidence in the case, that
the sole trustee who did sign the deed never intended to transfer the property or revoke
the trust thereby. (R.784 at 836-65.) The court consequently ordered the deed set aside.
(R.760-61; Aplee. Addend. Ex. 2.)
In pre-trial proceedings, the district court ruled in limine that the quitclaim deed
was invalid on its face. (R.731, 739-40.) The court held that, given the contents of the
deed in light of the trust documents and governing law, the deed did not revoke the trust
or transfer property out of the trust. (R.732-40.) The court's ruling in limine decided the
question put in issue by the pleadings. (R. 1-7, 36-37.)
At trial, the district court observed that the invalidity of the deed had already been
decided in limine. (R.782 at 16-23.) The court nevertheless allowed defendants Russell
Young and Patricia Zufelt to put on evidence to "make their record" with respect to their
separately argued theories of the trustors' "intent" outside of the executed documents.
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(R.782 at 17-22.) Over the course of a three-day bench trial, the district court heard
numerous witnesses and received numerous documents into evidence. (R.782-84.)
At the close of the evidence, the district court went beyond its ruling in limine in
confirming its decision about the trust property. (R.784 at 834.) The court made
extensive findings of fact on the record, weighing testimony and choosing between
competing versions of the facts. (R.784 at 830-79.) Each of the court's various fact
findings provided independent support for its previous ruling. (R.784 at 834-65.)
The appellant Russell Young has challenged neither the ruling in limine nor the
trial court's findings of fact. (Aplt. Br. at 4-30.) His challenge on appeal argues the
intent of the quitclaim deed following trial, without reference either to the pre-trial ruling
in limine or the post-trial findings. (Aplt. Br. at 4-30.)
Defendant Patricia Zufelt has not joined in the appeal. (Aplt. Br. at 4; R.767-68.)
Material Facts
Because of the fact-intensive nature of this appeal, the underlying material facts
are set forth here so that the course of the district court's proceedings and the disposition
below can be understood in context when discussed. See infra p. 8; U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7).
Eugene and Zelma Davis were husband and wife, married nearly 65 years. (R.3,
34.) They had three children: Steven Davis, Rex Davis, and Patricia Ann Zufelt. (R.2,
33.) Their grandchildren included Patricia's son Russell Young. (R.2, 33.) This brief
refers to first names to avoid confusion.
On October 27, 1993, Eugene and Zelma, acting as grantors and trustees, entered
into a trust agreement creating "The Eugene Davis and Zelma B. Davis Family Living
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Trust." (R. 153-59; Trial Ex. 10; Aplt. App. C.) Six weeks later, they deeded their farm
to the Trust. (R.260-61.) The deed was duly recorded. (R.260.) The parties agree that
this deed validly transferred the farm into the Trust. (R.783 at 310-12.)
The Trust agreement contained the following provisions governing revocation and
amendment of the Trust:
2.01 Powers Reserved by Grantors.
(a)
Revocation. While either grantor is living, the trust created
by this instrument may be revoked, in whole or in part, by an
instrument, signed by the Grantors, or the survivor of them, and
delivered to the Trustees. Upon revocation, the Trustees shall promptly
distribute to Grantors, or the survivor of them, all of the designated
portion of the properly comprising the trust estate.
(b)
Amendment. While either Grantor is living, this instrument
may be amended in any respect by an instrument signed by the
Grantors, or the survivor of them, and delivered to the Trustee.
(c)
Scope of Powers. The powers reserved by Grantors under
this Article 2.01 are exercisable in the absolute discretion of Grantors
and, except in conditions of mental incapacity (mental incapacity being
established by written certification of mental incapacity by two
physicians who are not beneficiaries and are not spouses, children or
siblings of beneficiaries of this trust), neither the Trustees nor any
beneficiary hereunder shall have any right or power to enforce or object
to the exercise of such powers.
(R. 153-54.)
The Trust agreement further contained the following provision regarding
Trust property:
2.02 Distribution of Income and Principal. While either Grantor is
living, the Trustee shall hold, manage, invest, and reinvest the trust
estate, collect the income therefrom and pay to Grantors, or to the
survivor of them, all, none, or such part of the net income and principal
of the trust estate as the Grantors may determine to be necessary for
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their medical care, maintenance, support, and reasonable comfort in
their accustomed manner of living.
(R.154.)
The Trust agreement provided for a modest cash distribution to each of six named
grandchildren, including Russell, upon the death of the surviving grantor. (R.155.) The
remaining Trust assets were then to be divided one-third to Steven, one-third to Patricia,
and one-sixth each to Rex and his ex-wife. (R.155.)
The Trust document appointed Eugene and Zelma as trustees during their
lifetimes. (R. 153, 156-57.) If either trustee were to "fail or cease to serve for any
reasons, the other may serve alone." (R. 156-57.) Steven and Patricia were appointed as
substitute co-trustees. (R.157.)
At the time they settled their Trust, Eugene and Zelma executed wills and durable
powers of attorney. (Trial Exs. 4, 6-7, 9; Aplt. Addend. Exs. A-B, D-E.) The wills each
provided for a "pour-over" of the testator's residuary estate into the Trust. (Trial Exs. 4
& 7, at 2-3.) Patricia and Steven were appointed as co-executors of the wills. (Trial Exs.
4 & 7 , atl.)
Zelma's power of attorney to Eugene read:
I, ZELMA B. DAVIS, of Duchesne, Utah hereby make, constitute,
and appoint EUGENE DAVIS, my true and lawful attorney in fact
for me and in my name, place, and stead, giving unto him full power
to do and perform all and every act that I may lawfully do through
an attorney in fact, and every proper power necessary to carry out
the purposes for which the power is granted, with full power of
substitution and revocation, hereby ratifying and affirming that
which his substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be done by him and
his substitute lawfully designated by virtue of the power herein
conferred upon him.. . .
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(R.124; Aplt. Addend. Ex. E.)
On September 5, 1997, Eugene and Zelma executed a holographic codicil to their
wills, leaving $5,000 of their estate to Russell. (Trial Ex. 13; Aplt. Addend. Ex. F.)
On July 11, 2000, Eugene and Zelma executed codicils to their wills adding
modest monetary bequests to each of two great-grandchildren; removing Russell from
receiving a monetary bequest; and dividing the residuary estate in fourths between
Steven, Patricia, Russell, and Rex (with his ex-wife). (Trial Exs. 5, 8.)
Eugene died on March 12, 2003. (R.784 at 843.)
Following Eugene's death, Russell for the first time produced the quitclaim deed
that is the subject of this lawsuit. (R.783 at 489, 556-57; 784 at 655.) The deed stated in
typewritten language that it was a quitclaim to Russell from "Eugene and Zelma B. Davis
Trustees." (R.17; Aplt. Addend. Ex. I.) It was signed "Eugene Davis" on January 1,
2001, and notarized that same day. (R. 17.) Next to Eugene's name was the handwritten
word "Trustee," which Eugene did not write and which was not added until after his
death. (R.17, 784 at 843.) No one else signed the deed on January 1, 2001. (R.784 at
855.)
Below Eugene's signed name was a "mark" placed there by Zelma on March 21,
2003, nine days after Eugene's death. (R.17, 784 at 843.) It was notarized as Zelma's
"signature" on March 21, 2003. (R.17.) The notary, Cora Lee Sanchez, added the word
"Trustee" after Eugene's name at the time she notarized Zelma's "mark." (R.782 at 23536; 784 at 854-55.)

366159v4

7

The quitclaim deed contained typewritten recitations stating that the consideration
given was "the sum of Ten DOLLARS, and other good & valuable consideration."
(R. 127.) Russell has conceded, however, that no consideration supported the deed.
(R.782 at 17; 783 at 491.) The deed did not mention by name The Eugene Davis and
Zelma B. Davis Family Living Trust or otherwise identify the Trust as a grantor to a
conveyance. (R.17.)
Zelma died on October 16, 2005. (R.782 at 174.)
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff Steven R. Davis, as trustee of The Eugene Davis and Zelma B. Davis
Living Trust, filed suit against Russell and Patricia on July 2, 2003. (R. 1.) The
complaint sought relief on two grounds: (1) to impose a constructive trust on the farm
that was the subject of the recorded quitclaim deed; and (2) to remove Patricia as a cotrustee for breach of fiduciary duty. (R.2-7.) Patricia was subsequently removed as cotrustee and co-executor in a separate probate case, leaving the validity of the quitclaim
deed for determination in this case. (R.434-38, 783 at 560.)
Russell answered the complaint. (R.32.) His sole affirmative defense was that the
farm was conveyed to him in 2001 and was not owned by the Trust. (R.36.)
During the course of the proceedings, Steven filed, inter alia, four motions in
limine seeking pre-trial determinations with respect to the Trust and the quitclaim deed.
(R.620-34.) Russell responded in two trial briefs, arguing the effect of the quitclaim deed
in light of the documents and the law. (R.635-42, 658-62.) Following briefing, the court
held a hearing on the motions. (R.652-54.)
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On August 9, 2006, the court issued its ruling and order on the motions in limine.
(R.731-43; Aplee. Addend. Ex. 1.) The court held in material part that, absent additional
evidence, the deed was invalid to revoke the Trust based solely on Eugene's signature in
January 2001. (R.739.) The court based its ruling on four independent grounds:
(a) the deed was not signed in January 2001 by both grantors as required by
paragraph 2.01(a) to revoke the Trust;
(b) the deed was signed by Eugene in his capacity as trustee, not as "grantor" as
required to revoke the Trust;
(c) the terms of the Trust required a separate instrument that specifically revoked
the Trust so that the trustees could return the Trust property to the grantors per the terms
of the Trust; and
(d) the deed was invalid to the extent not supported by fair value as consideration
because the terms of the Trust require that it provide for the "necessary medical care,
maintenance, support, and reasonable comfort" of Eugene and Zelma in their accustomed
manner of living. (R.739-40.)
On September 25, 2006, the case was called up for a bench trial. (R.782.) During
opening statements, Russell proffered that he did "not contend that the Quit Claim Deed
was supported by consideration." (R.782 at 17.) Based on this concession, the court
noted that it had already ruled contrary to Russell's positions, including holding that the
quitclaim deed was invalid because it was not supported by consideration. (R.782 at 1617.) The court pointed out that its ruling on the issue was "dispositive." (R.782 at 19.)
In further colloquy, the court noted: "I don't intend to try a case on issues I've already
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ruled on." (R.782 at 20.) The court acknowledged its decisions were not made on
summary judgment, but indicated that its decisions "will apply." (R.782 at 22.)
Russell argued, however, that he intended to present evidence "to create and
preserve a record" even though he expected the court would "rule as it has previously
done." (R.782 at 20.) Russell argued that he intended to put on additional evidence that
would go to Eugene's and Zelma's "intent." (R.782 at 19.)
The court proceeded to trial on this basis. (R.782 at 22-23.) Both sides put on
witnesses and presented documentary evidence. (R.782-84.) Patricia was allowed to
participate in full as aligned with Russell. (R.782-84.)
During trial, the court reiterated that it had already determined certain issues in its
pre-trial ruling and order. (R.782 at 100, 193.) When Russell attempted to introduce into
evidence the quitclaim deed, the court acknowledged Steven's objection that "the court
has already determined that it's invalid on its face." (R.782 at 100.) The court confirmed
that the quitclaim deed "is not being introduced to go contrary to the court's ruling that
it's not effective to transfer." (R.782 at 101.) The court consequently received the deed
for the sole purpose of suggesting that "the intended purpose and intent" of the deed was
consistent with Eugene's and Zelma's prior expressed intentions regarding disposition of
the farm property. (R.782 at 101, 102.) The court reiterated thereafter that, in the court's
judgment, issues decided before trial were "not reopened." (R.782 at 193.) The court did
not undertake to reconsider its pre-trial ruling, but stood by it despite disagreement from
Russell about its effect. (R.782 at 16-23; 784 at 778-82.)
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At trial, the district court admitted 20 separate trial exhibits and heard evidence
from 21 different witnesses. (R.782-84.) Among numerous other items of evidence, the
following was admitted:
•

Eugene and Zelma undertook their trust and estate planning with the assistance of
an estate planner, Mr. Stanley Morrell. (R.782 at 26-28.)

•

Mr. Morrell explained to Eugene and Zelma in detail the authority they had with
respect to the Trust property, including their fiduciary capacities. (R.782 at 72.)

•

Mr. Morrell did not tell Eugene and Zelma they could use their respective powers
of attorney to sign for each other as trustees. (R.782 at 110-13.)

•

Mr. Morrell never told Eugene and Zelma they could give their Trust property
away without consideration. (R.782 at 126.)

•

Mr. Morrell testified that the Trust was to provide for Eugene's and Zelma's
maintenance, support, and living while they were alive. (R.782 at 131.)

•

Mr. Morrell prepared for Eugene and Zelma typewritten amendments to their
Trust in 1994. (R.782 at 28-29; Trial Exs. 29-30.)

•

Mr. Morrell discussed with Eugene and Zelma the potential of Russell's buying
the farm, but prepared no documents to that effect. (R.782 at 118.)

•

Eugene and Zelma had discussions about Russell purchasing the farm, although
there was a disagreement regarding terms. (R.782 at 118, 129, 202; 784 at 687.)

•

The farm was never mentioned as a gift. (R.782 at 289-90; 783 at 373, 376; 784 at
701-02; Trial Ex. 15.)
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•

Eugene said if he were to give things away, his son Rex probably needed the farm
worse than the others. (R.783 at 376.)

•

Eugene and Russell talked about Russell buying the farm after the date appearing
on the quitclaim deed. (R.783 at 448-50, 519; Trial Ex. 16.)

•

Eugene told Arlene Horrocks that his grandson would get a share of the farm out
of his share of the family trust, then would have to pay for the rest. (R.783 at
346.)

•

Eugene continued to work the farm as if it was his until his death. (R.783 at 325,
367, 375, 376-77, 389.)

•

Eugene said he would not repeat a scenario where Russell had obtained different
land from Eugene and Zelma by paying them only what had been paid for it 20
years earlier. (R.784 at 684-85.)

•

Eugene knew what he wanted and was very firm in his opinions. (R.783 at 464,
532-33, 587; 784 at 625, 694.)

•

Testimony from third parties regarding Eugene's and Zelma's intent contradicted
the written expressions in the documents they executed. (R.782 at 103; 783 at
535.)

•

Russell did not record the quitclaim deed in 2001 because he thought he was still
leasing the farm from Eugene. (R.783 at 502-03.)
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•

After Eugene's death, Russell did not say Eugene had given him the farm, but
rather asked his cousin, "[D]on't you think Grandpa would want me to have the
farm"? (R.782 at 183, 185-86.)

•

Russell and Patricia were concerned Zelma needed to sign the quitclaim deed even
though Eugene already had. (R.782 at 219-20.)

•

Russell removed the Trust documents from Eugene's safe and provided them only
after suit was filed and pursuant to court order, even though Eugene had instructed
him to give them to the trustees. (R.783 at 486-88; 784 at 655.)

•

Cora Lee Sanchez did not think Zelma realized the costs she was facing at the time
Zelma "signed" the deed. (R.782 at 231.)

•

The last two to three years of his life, Eugene was receiving approximately $900
per month from government sources. (R.783 at 467, 562; 784 at 667.)

•

Eugene would not want Zelma to be a ward of the state. (R.783 at 391.)

•

After Eugene's death, Zelma was running low on personal funds and had to start
using Medicaid. (R.783 at 571.)

•

Zelma was competent at the time she signed the codicil to her will in 2000.
(R.782 at 136.)

•

Zelma was stable from her stroke in 1994 into the early 2000s, then began to
decline. (R.782 at 155-56.)

•
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•

Zelma's decline was most pronounced in Spring 2003 after Eugene's death.
(R.782 at 144.)

•

Steven started serving as trustee in Zelma's place after Eugene's death. (R.784 at
653.)

•

A guardian ad litem was appointed for Zelma in October 2003. (R.782 at 195.)
At the close of the evidence, the court allowed amendments to conform to the

evidence to consider two additional issues: (1) where the farm property should ultimately
be titled (i.e., in the Trust, in an estate, or in Russell); and (2) the effect of the 1997
codicil giving Russell $5,000. (R.784 at 714-24.)
During closing arguments, the district court noted that Patricia and Russell were
asking the court to "do the impossible" by seeking a ruling based on intent outside the
actual executed documents. (R.784 at 753.) Nevertheless, the court heard argument from
all parties. (R.784 at 724-830.) Russell informed the court that he was not asking the
court to modify its order in limine but rather to apply it to the facts of the case. (R.784 at
773.)
Following closing arguments, the district court ruled from the bench, making
extensive factual findings. (R.784 at 830-65.) The court found that gifts were not
allowed under the Trust; that the deed was not supported by fair value; and that a trustee
could not dispose of the Trust's farm property individually without fair consideration.
(R.784 at 832-33.) The court found that the only evidence on value was a discussion of
tax value, which did not equal fair market value. (R.784 at 833.)
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The district judge then found that neither the deed nor any codicil modified or
amended the Trust. (R.784 at 833.) He indicated that he had "ruled in the past" and was
"comfortable with my prior ruling" that the deed failed to satisfy the terms of the Trust.
(R.784 at 831, 834.) He went further in his bench ruling, however, identifying alternative
grounds for his findings and indicating he would go "beyond, way beyond" his prior
ruling in limine. (R.784 at 832, 835.)
The court found that Eugene was not acting under Zelma's power of attorney
when he signed the quitclaim deed. (R.784 at 836-37.) The court noted that Eugene had
signed only once, not twice. (R.784 at 836-37.) Furthermore, Zelma's power of attorney
did not grant power to Eugene to act for her in a fiduciary or trust capacity. (R.784 at
836-37.) The court held that a trustee in Eugene's position did not have unfettered
discretion regarding Trust property and that Eugene could not, consistent with his Trust
obligations, ignore duties owed to Zelma. (R.784 at 845.)
The court next found on the evidence that the quitclaim deed did not support
Russell's arguments. (R.784 at 845.) The court found that Eugene's and Zelma's general
intent over time was that Russell would have to pay for the property to get it. (R.784 at
846.) The court further found that Eugene's and Zelma's written expression of intent
controlled over any contrary testimony regarding their intent. (R.784 at 847.) The court
indicated it did not give great weight to the testimony of those individuals who had
testified. (R.784 at 848.) The court took note of admitted evidence that was inconsistent
with an intent that Russell get the farm without consideration. (R.784 at 848.) Moreover,
the court found that neither Russell nor Eugene had actually recognized the quitclaim
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deed as effective because they had subsequently discussed Russell's obtaining the
property from Eugene by paying tax value over six years, a deal that nevertheless was
never consummated. (R.784 at 842, 848; Trial Ex. 16.) In all events, the court found no
such efforts were effective because the farm property remained in the Trust. (R.784 at
849.)
The court noted there was no testimony or evidence that the farm was ever
intended as a gift to Russell. (R.784 at 849.) The court rejected the evidentiary
suggestion that Eugene and Zelma were acting in 2001 on any statements that their estate
planner may have told them many years earlier; and that, in all events, statements were
made to Eugene and Zelma consistent with what they had actually done through the
documents. (R.784 at 850.)
The court noted also that amendments to the Trust had been prepared, showing
Eugene and Zelma knew how to amend in compliance with the Trust provisions. (R.784
at 851.) The court found they would have amended or revoked the Trust by the same
process had they intended to do so. (R.784 at 851.)
The court found that neither Eugene nor Zelma indicated they were signing as
trustee even though the deed purported to be a transfer by the trustees. (R.784 at 854-55;
Trial Ex. 15.) The court gave no weight to the word "Trustee" placed next to Eugene's
name by a third party after Eugene's death. (R.784 at 855.) The court found the
document was signed only by Eugene in January 2001, and assumed it was in his
capacity as trustee. (R.784 at 854-56.)
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With respect to Zelma's signature, the court found that a confidential relationship
existed between Zelma and Russell. (R.784 at 856.) There was, as conceded by Russell,
no consideration or any claim that adequate consideration was given for the property.
(R.784 at 857.) The court found Zelma held no consistent intent regarding a desire to
give Russell the farm, but rather had changing ideas about what to do with it. (R.784 at
857.) The court found that by signing the deed in 2003, Zelma was not putting into effect
a long-held belief about what to do with the farm. (R.784 at 857.) The court specifically
noted evidence that Zelma did not want to give Russell the farm. (R.784 at 858.)
The court also noted that evidence regarding Zelma's capacity was greatly in
conflict. (R.784 at 858.) The court found that her capacity was changing from time to
time. (R.784 at 858.) The court focused its determination of her mental condition on the
time she signed or placed her "mark" on the deed after Eugene's death in March 2003.
(R.784 at 859.) The court found that her mental condition had deteriorated from 1994,
after her stroke, notwithstanding Russell's argument that her deterioration had been
physical rather than mental. (R.784 at 859-60.) The district judge then found that he did
not believe Zelma had focused on the issue of the deed after Eugene's death, and he
specifically discredited any testimony to that effect. (R.784 at 861.) He further found
that he did not believe that Zelma had summoned a third party to execute the deed, but
rather found that Patricia and Russell were the "instigators" in bringing the act about,
(R.784 at 861-62.)
Based on these findings, the court found that at the time Zelma placed her "mark"
on the deed, she was not in a condition or state of mind to dispose of property. (R.784 at
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864.) The court further found that Russell had not overcome a presumption of undue
influence on Zelma; and that, even if there had been no presumption, she was in no state
of mind to dispose of property. (R.784 at 865.) The court noted finally that the Trust
was intended to cover this very situation, where Zelma was not capable of acting at the
time of her "signature" in March 2003. (R.784 at 869.)
Based on these findings, the court held that the quitclaim deed was of no force or
effect and was null and void. (R.784 at 875.) The court therefore directed that an order
enter holding the quitclaim deed null and void ab initio. (R.784 at 879.)
Statutory Provisions at Issue in this Appeal
The following sections of the Utah Code have been put in issue by the appellant's
arguments: U.C.A. §§ 75-7-605(2) -(3), -816, -1103(l)(a) & (3) (2004). Pursuant to
U R.A.P. 24(a)(6), these sections are quoted in full in Exhibit 3 to the Appellee's
Addendum.
Summary of the Argument
Three grounds call for this Court to summarily affirm the district court's decision.
First, Russell fails to appeal or argue the relevant rulings or satisfy the governing
standards of review. Russell has not challenged, or even mentioned, the district court's
ruling in limine, which held dispositively that the quitclaim deed was invalid. Instead, he
focuses on the trial, in which the quitclaim deed was not admitted in evidence as a valid
transfer. His trial challenge, however, fails to acknowledge the district court's extensive
findings of fact, and he fails to marshal the evidence or demonstrate that any fact is

366159v.4

18

"clearly erroneous." Consequently, his appeal fails under well-established standards of
review.
Second, Russell raises new arguments in this appeal that fail even if reviewed. His
"retroactivity," "community property," and "failure to serve" arguments are all raised for
the first time on appeal. This Court is not the forum in which to re-try cases based on
new theories or to argue selective evidence in support of any theory. The bulk of
Russell's argument - all of his Part A and a substantial portion of his Part B - necessarily
fails for this clear-cut reason. Moreover, even if such issues could be raised now, they
fail on this record in light of the controlling law, especially where standards of review
have not been met.
Third, applying proper standards of review, Russell's appeal fails on its merits.
Even if this Court were to consider Russell's arguments, they fail as a matter of fact and
law. The application of law to a fact-intensive post-trial record is a mixed question of
fact and law, not a pure de novo review. Russell has neither marshaled nor demonstrated
error in the trial court's ruling. The law of trusts in Utah requires adherence to the terms
of the trust documents. The district court properly found on all the evidence that such
terms were not met to revoke the Trust here. The court found further that Eugene and
Zelma never intended to transfer the farm or to revoke the Trust, by means of a power of
attorney or otherwise. Accordingly, all of Russell's arguments fail on their merits.
Consequently, no matter how this appeal is viewed, the district court's order
should be affirmed.
Each of these points will be addressed in turn.
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Argument
I.

The district court's order should be affirmed because Russell has not
challenged either the controlling ruling in limine or the factual findings
following trial.
The core of this appeal fails under established standards of review. Russell has

failed to appeal either the controlling pre-trial ruling in limine or the subsequent post-trial
findings of fact. Without a challenge on the former, and without marshaling and a
sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument on the latter, his appeal has no basis.
This glaring deficiency infects the entirety of his briefing. Thus, if the Court
agrees with this Part I that appellate prerequisites for review have not been met, the Court
need not consider the arguments set forth infra in Parts II and III.
A.

Russell has not challenged the district court's ruling in limine.

Before trial, the district court issued a lengthy and carefully crafted ruling in
limine regarding the effect of the quitclaim deed in light of the documents in this case.
(R.731-43.) In his brief, Russell makes no mention of the district court's ruling in limine,
nor does he purport to appeal it. (Aplt. Br. passim.)
Instead of challenging the pre-trial ruling, Russell appeals only those decisions
made after a trial on all the evidence. (Aplt. Br. at 11-30.) The record demonstrates,
however, that the district court did not re-open its ruling in limine. (R.782 at 100, 193.)
Indeed, the district court refused to admit into evidence the quitclaim deed at the center of
this case to support Russell's claim that it effected a conveyance or revocation - an
argument that would have run counter to the ruling already issued. (R.782 at 100.) The
court also reiterated that it would not retry those issues once decided, and it did not.
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(R.782 at 193.) Instead, the court noted at the close of the case that it remained
"comfortable" with the ruling it had made before trial. (R.784 at 834.)
The effect of the quitclaim deed considered in light of the documents and without
any other evidence or testimony was thus decided before trial. While Russell repeatedly
disagreed with the effect of that ruling, the district court stood firm and did not re-open
the issues previously decided. (R.782 at 100, 193.) To the contrary, the district court
confirmed its decision at every turn. (R.782 at 16-23; 784 at 778-82.) Russell's failure to
appeal and argue the pre-trial ruling is therefore fatal. See State v. Rodriguez, 841 P.2d
1228, 1229 (Utah App. 1992).
Nevertheless, even if Russell's challenge to the trial ruling is considered, it
necessarily fails, as shown next.
B.

Russell has not challenged the district court's findings of fact made
after a three-day trial.

Russell insisted on a trial to "create a record" and specifically to argue the "intent"
of Eugene and Zelma with respect to the farm. (R.782 at 19-21.) The district court noted
that the task Russell undertook was "impossible," as Russell and Patricia were seeking to
establish intent based on evidence outside the controlling documents. (R.784 at 753.)
Nevertheless, the court afforded Russell that opportunity at his request. (R.782 at 22-23.)
At the close of trial, the district court recited numerous detailed findings of fact
that went "way beyond" its prior ruling in limine. (R.784 at 830-79.) The district judge
noted that those findings, supported in great detail by the evidence, and expounded over
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50 pages of trial transcript, provided an independent basis for his ruling invalidating the
quitclaim deed. (R.784 at 834.)
Despite taking an appeal from the district court's post-trial factual findings,
however, Russell has not challenged a single one of those findings. (Aplt. Br. passim)
Instead, he has suggested that this Court should undertake a de novo review of his issues.
(Aplt. Br. at 1-4.) He then selectively argues trial evidence in support. (Aplt. Br. at 8-10,
17, 20-22, 23-26, 29-30.) This approach all but ignores the lengthy trial he insisted upon
to create a record. (R.782 at 16-21.) It also ignores governing standards of review. See
Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, \ 9, 144 P.3d 1147 ("An appellant may not simply cite
to the evidence which supports his or her position and hope to prevail.").
The question of intent is a quintessential issue of fact. See Pennington v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) (emphasizing that "intent is a question of fact").
Russell maintained below that the question of whether the farm could be gifted was a
question of fact. (R.659.5 [omitted in record pagination].) His theory at trial, which
contradicted the face of the deed, was necessarily a question of fact. See Judkins v.
Toone, 492 P.2d 980, 982 (Utah 1972) (where owner of deeded property advances theory
contradicting recitals in deed, judgment as a matter of law is not appropriate). Indeed, the
interpretation of a trust that includes consideration of extrinsic evidence is a question of
fact. See Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
There can be little doubt, then, that a post-trial decision made after considering
nearly two dozen witnesses, conflicting testimony, debatable inferences, numerous
documents, and detailed findings of fact, is factually based. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
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932, 935 (Utah 1994) (defining findings of fact as "entailing the empirical"), modified in
part on other grounds by State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, \ 25, 144 P.3d 1096. Nevertheless,
Russell tries to shoehorn all these factual issues into a purely legal rubric. (Aplt. Br. at 14.) This transparent attempt should be seen for what it is and rejected.
This Court rejected a similar attempt in Boulton v. Bronn, 2006 Utah App 91, an
unpublished decision relied upon by Russell. Boulton considered questions of intent in
revoking a trust where the grantor, trustee, and beneficiary were all the same person.
Following a bench trial, the district court found that the trust had been revoked. On
appeal, the appellant argued based on the documents that review should be undertaken de
novo. This Court firmly disagreed:
Although questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic
evidence are matters of law, the trial court's findings here were based on more
than the terms of a contract. The court relied upon a variety of evidence, including
the Trust deed, documents relating to the sale of the Trust property, documents
relating to the creation of the [bank] account, and the testimony of witnesses.
Id at *2 n.l (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court reviewed the
facts under Rule 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous" standard. See id. at *2.
That same scenario repeats itself here. This appeal is heavily fact-based - as are
the cases Russell relies on to support his position regarding revocation. See Boulton v.
Bronn, 2006 UT App. 91, at *l-*5 (affirming district court's finding on the evidence
following trial); Waldron v. Commerce Union Bank, 577 S.W.2d 669, 675 (Tenn. 1978)
(affirming chancellor's finding on the evidence); Enoch v. Enoch, No. 3:04-0920, at *14
& n.7 (M.D. Tenn., Apr. 14, 2006) (making finding in trial court proceedings when
denying summary judgment). Accordingly, factual standards of review apply.
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Unchallenged fact findings are deemed established on appeal. See Saunders v.
Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). The unchallenged findings of fact in this appeal
are themselves dispositive of Russell's arguments. For example:
•

The trial court found as a matter of fact that gifts of major trust assets were not
allowed under the Trust. (R.659.5, 784 at 832-33.)

•

The trial court found as a matter of fact that Eugene did not intend to give Russell
the farm as a gift. (R.784 at 846, 858.)

•

The trial court found as a matter of fact that if Russell were to get the farm,
Eugene intended that he would have to pay fair market value for it. (R.784 at
846.)

•

The trial court found as a matter of fact that Russell never consummated any deal
to pay fair market value for the farm. (R.784 at 842, 848.)

•

The trial court found as a matter of fact that Eugene did not intend to act for Zelma
when executing the quitclaim deed. (R.784 at 836.)

•

The trial court found as a matter of fact that neither Eugene nor Russell believed
that the quitclaim deed had transferred the farm out of the Trust. (R.784 at 842,
848.)

•

The trial court found as a matter of fact that Eugene and Zelma would have
executed actual revocation papers, consistent with their other actions, had they
intended to revoke the Trust with respect to the farm. (R.784 at 851.)
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The evidence supports these and all other unchallenged findings. See supra pp.
11-14; R.782-84. In all events, Russell would have to marshal the evidence to challenge
the findings, as required by Utah precedent. He has neither marshaled nor analyzed the
facts in light of the appropriate standard of review. See McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d
302, 305 (Utah App. 1992).
Because Russell has not appealed any factual determinations, the core of all his
arguments fails. These include each of the factually based statements and arguments he
makes in his brief:
•

Russell argues there was substantial compliance with the terms of the Trust.
(Aplt. Br. at 13-14.) This is a question of fact. See Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P.2d
927, 931 (Utah App. 1990) (citing American Petrofina Co. v. D & L Oil Supply,
Inc., 583 P.2d 521, 528 (Ore. 1978) (substantial contract performance is a
question of fact)).

•

Russell says Eugene's actions with respect to the quitclaim deed "must also be
considered the actions of Zelma." (Aplt. Br. at 17.) This is factual.

•

Russell says he adduced "clear and convincing evidence" of an intent to partially
revoke the trust and convey the farm to Russell. (Aplt. Br. at 18-20.) This is a
standard for assigning weight to evidence, requiring marshaling. See Merriam v.
Merriarn, 799 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah App. 1990).

•

Russell says the deed did not fail for lack of consideration because no
consideration was necessary - a ruling Russell refers to twice as a "finding."
(Aplt. Br. at 20-22.)

366159v4

25

•

Russell says Eugene had authority to act alone based on "relevant facts of the
record." (Aplt. Br. at 22.)

•

Russell says Zelma "failed to serve" as trustee under the Trust. (Aplt. Br. at 2324.)

•

Russell says Eugene intended to act and did act as attorney in fact for Zelma.
(Aplt. Br. at 28-30.)

•

Russell says Zelma "signed" the deed. (Aplt. Br. at 10.) The district court found
as a matter of fact that she was incompetent to sign the deed. (R.784 at 865; see
a/so R. 112, 120, 784 at 739.)

•

Russell states as a material fact: "Shortly after Eugene's death, Zelma
communicated her desire to sign the deed and have it recorded." (Aplt. Br. at 9.)
The district court found as a matter of fact that she formed no such intent, indeed
could form no such intent. (R.784 at 861-65.) The district court specifically and
pointedly rejected the evidence Russell now relies upon when making its
findings. (R.784 at 861-65.)

Having chosen to "make a record" by trying the case for three days, Russell cannot
simply ignore the fact evidence and the factual rulings that necessarily resulted. This is
precisely what he has done. His failure to appeal any facts, and his concomitant failure to
marshal in support of any factually based argument, dooms this appeal in its entirety. He
has neither stated nor analyzed the facts under the proper standards of review. Instead he
has argued selective facts to support his view of the case. His appeal therefore fails.
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In sum, Russell has failed to adequately appeal or brief arguments on either the
controlling pre-trial ruling in limine or the controlling post-trial findings of fact. The
result is a failure of his appeal in all respects. The decision below should therefore be
affirmed, and the Court need not reach the arguments set forth in Parts II and III, infra.
II.

The district court's order should be affirmed because Russell has raised new
issues on appeal that were not raised or preserved below.
In addition to the grounds set forth in Part I above, the bulk of Russell's appeal

fails for an independent reason. At least three of Russell's principal arguments were not
raised below and are presented for the first time in this appeal.
This Court's rules require an appellant to demonstrate that issues raised on appeal
were properly raised and preserved in the district court. With respect to each issue
argued, an appellant must provide "citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not
preserved in the trial court." U.R.A.P. 24(a)(5)(A), (B). In lieu of meeting this
requirement, Russell has noted only that the district court's order was a final order and
that he filed a timely notice of appeal. (Aplee. Br. at 1-4.) This fails to meet the
mandates of the rule with respect to both the ruling in limine and the post-trial findings of
fact.
All of Part A in Russell's appeal brief and a substantial portion of Part B are based
on arguments first raised now that are not properly before this Court. The Court should
decline to address all such issues.
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A.

RusseiPs "retroactivity" argument is raised for the first time on
appeal, and fails in all events.
1.

This issue was not preserved in the district court.

In all of Part A and in Part B.l of his briefing, Russell advances arguments based
on U.C.A. § 75-7-605(2) (2004). This section is part of the Utah Uniform Trust Code,
which became effective on July 1, 2004, as Chapter 7 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
See U.C.A. §§ 75-7-1103, 75-7-101 et seq. The district court held that statutory sections
deriving from the Trust Code, newly enacted in 2004, did not apply to the events in
question because they preceded the new Code's effective date. (R.784 at 827-30, 833.)
Russell argues in Part A.l of his brief that U.C.A. § 75-7-605 applies
"retroactively" and should therefore govern the analysis in this appeal. (Aplt. Br. at 11.)
From that premise, he goes on in Parts A. 1, A.2, and B. 1 to set forth an analysis applying
this statute. (Aplt. Br. at 11-23.) Without a positive determination that this section
applies "retroactively," his arguments based on this statutory premise are demonstrably
moot.
However, this "retroactivity" argument is advanced for the first time on appeal.
Russell did not argue in the district court that this section should apply retroactively. In
fact, he argued that the provisions of the 2004 Trust Code did not apply, and he agreed
with the district court's determination on this point.
The record reveals that, at the close of trial, Russell opposed Steven's application
of a different statutory provision within the newly adopted Trust Code because it had not
been enacted until 2004. (R.784 at 822.) Russell argued:
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The last point I would like to make is that the statute relied upon by the plaintiff as
invalidating the Quit Claim Deed is not applicable to this case at all because it was
an amendment to the code effective July 1, 2004. And all it really is is a new
amendment to the probate code that governs the activities of trustees. It was not in
force at the time that all of these events occurred and, and it is in fact not
applicable to the activities of these, of these participants.
(R.784 at 822.) In further argument and colloquy, the district judge observed that U.C.A.
§ 75-7-605 - relied upon by Russell - was likewise enacted in 2004, and therefore
likewise did not apply. Given his prior argument, Russell had to agree:
THE JUDGE: I have a question. The statute that was cited by you is also
amended in 2004.
[RUSSELL'S COUNSEL]: Pardon me?
THE JUDGE: The statute that you cited was also amended in 2004
I'm looking at my book, it says 2004.
It appears the entire section was, did not exist prior to 2004 according to the
information that I've got.
[PATRICIA'S COUNSEL]: That would be my understanding Your
Honor....
[RUSSELL'S COUNSEL]: It looks like that section, or the Utah Uniform
Trust Code was made effective July 1, 2004. I guess we all have to do some
looking into the history to see what any prior case law or other law it was taken
from. I think it's totally consistent with the restatement section that we did cite to
you. But I think you're correct, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE: So it's not controlling.
(R.784 at 827-30.) The court then held that § 75-7-605 did not apply, based on "the same
reason that [Russell] has argued" - because it was not in effect when the events took
place. (R.784 at 833, referring to 77-7-605 [sic].)
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Russell did not argue below that § 75-7-605 should apply even though it was
enacted after the events in question. Nor did he argue that it should apply "retroactively."
To the contrary, he agreed with the district court that the statute was not controlling.
Indeed, he had little choice, as he was the one who had first raised the effective date of
the statute as an issue, arguing that the statute, enacted after the events in question, did
not control.
'"Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in
order to preserve an issue for appeal.'" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 14, 128 P.3d 1171
(brackets in original) (quoting State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, If 45, 114 P.3d 551). Issues
that have not been "specifically raised," and supported by "evidence or relevant legal
authority," will not be considered on appeal. Pratt, 2007 UT 41, | 15, 127 P.3d 1256.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of invited error, the effective-date argument that Russell
raised as the basis for obtaining a ruling cannot subsequently provide him a ground for
appeal. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 15 ("[A] party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error.")
(citations and quotations omitted). Because Russell agreed that § 75-7-605 was not
applicable, because he created the issue, and because he failed ever to give the trial court
an opportunity to address the purported error through evidence or relevant legal authority,
he is precluded from raising the issue now. See id.
In his appeal, Russell also relies on § 75-7-1103(l)(a) to support his new
retroactivity argument. (Aplt. Br. at 13.) He neither raised nor argued § 75-7-1103(l)(a)
below. This argument therefore fails for all the same reasons.
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Because the retroactivity issue was not litigated by the parties below, this appeal is
not the proper place to determine the retroactivity of the statute for the first time. See
Pratt, supra. This issue, and the arguments that flow from it in Russell's Part A and Part
B, should be rejected by the Court under firmly established principles of appellate
review.
2.

The Trust Code does not affect any act preceding its effective date.

In all events, Russell's newly minted retroactivity argument fails on its face. This
Court may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT
58,1J10, 52 P.3d 1158.
"The general rule followed in Utah is that 'the substantive law to be applied
throughout an action is the law in effect at the date the action was initiated.'" Wilde v.
Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968, 970
(Utah App. 1994). This action was commenced in 2003, before the Trust Code was
enacted and became effective. (R.l.)
There is, furthermore, a general presumption against retroactivity in statutory
construction that has been codified by the Legislature. See Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d
245, 253 (Utah 1988); U.C.A. § 68-3-3. Even if a retroactivity analysis were implicated,
the 2004 Trust Code specifically says it does not apply retroactively to events such as
those at issue here. Rather, it leaves intact the effect of events that preceded its
enactment: "An act done before July 1, 2004 is not affected by this chapter." U.C.A. §
75-7-1103(3). Russell's counsel argued it best when he said that the statute "was not in
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force at the time that all of these events occurred, and it is in fact not applicable to the
activities of these participants." (R.784 at 822.)
The substantive question in this appeal is whether Eugene intended to revoke the
Trust in 2001. That can only be measured by his acts preceding his death in 2003. Under
the provisions of the 2004 Trust Code, those acts are not affected by the subsequent
adoption of the Code. They did not take on a different meaning in 2004, after Eugene's
death, and after the commencement of this lawsuit, by the enactment of a new Trust
statute. See Salt Lake Coffee & Spice Co. v. District Court, 140 P. 666, 669 (Utah 1914)
(holding subsequently enacted statute does not affect completed acts); In re Schlagel
Trust, 51 P.3d 1094, 1095 (Colo. App. 2002) (applying common law principles to trust
revocation document executed prior to effective date of statute).
3.

Even if the Trust Code applied, the result would be the same.

Assuming arguendo that the 2004 Trust Code could apply to the 2001 quitclaim
deed, the end result would be the same as that reached by the district court. Under the
terms of the statute, a trust may be revoked either through substantial compliance with
the trust's revocation provisions or by "any other method manifesting clear and
convincing evidence of the settlor's intent." U.C.A. § 75-7-605(3).
Before holding that § 75-7-605 did not apply, the district court had already
determined that neither of these requirements was satisfied by the deed. (R.739.) The
district court ruled in limine that "the deed does not substantially comply with the
provisions of the trust, nor does it manifest a clear and convincing intent to revoke the
trust." (R.739.)
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Even if Russell had appealed the ruling in limine, there is no sound evidentiary or
legal basis from which to argue that the signature of one trustee on the quitclaim deed
constituted "substantial compliance" with the Trust provisions requiring the signature of
two grantors to revoke. Plainly, the consent of one party acting in a different capacity
cannot qualify as substantial compliance with a requirement that two parties acting in
different capacities both give their consent for a particular action. See Guardian State
Bank v. Lambert, 834 P.2d 605, 607-608 (Utah App. 1992) (omission of required
signature cannot qualify as substantial compliance).
Nor is this of itself evidence of a "clear and convincing intent to revoke the trust,"
and certainly not as a matter of law. Russell did not make this argument below under
§ 75-7-605(3)(b) in connection with the arguments made in limine. (R.635-42, 658-62.)
The trial court specifically found at the close of all the evidence that Eugene did not
intend to gift the farm to Russell and/or revoke the Trust. (R.784 at 830-65.) Having
undertaken no factual challenge to this or any other finding, Russell is in no position now
to argue the weight of the evidence. See supra Part LB.
In addition, the decision below may be affirmed on any ground supported by the
record. If the 2004 Trust Code applies to this dispute, then a separate section of that
Code, § 75-7-816, rendered the quitclaim deed invalid as a matter of law. (R.784 at 743.)
Steven argued the application of this separate section below - which Russell opposed by
pointing out that its 2004 effective date made it inapplicable. (R.784 at 822.)
Section 75-7-816 requires that, for a grantee to receive a conveyance from a
trustee, the deed "shall" contain specific recitals, including the name of the trustee, the
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address of the trustee, and the name and date of the trust. U.C.A. § 75-7-816(3). The
evidence is undisputed that the quitclaim deed did not contain the information required
by the statute, despite Russell's knowledge of the Trust. (R. 17, 782 at 409.)
Accordingly, if the 2004 Trust Code applies after the fact to the pre-statutory events at
issue in this case, then the quitclaim deed is invalid for the independent reasons contained
in U.C.A. §75-7-816(3).
In sum, Russell invited the very "error" of which he now complains. His appeal
arguments regarding the retroactivity of the 2004 Trust Code were not raised below.
Accordingly, they should not be considered in this appeal. The effect is to moot the
arguments in Part A and Part B. 1 of Russell's brief. Even if the 2004 Trust Code did
apply, moreover, the record and the law confirm that the decision below should be
affirmed. See also infra Part III (further analyzing the merits of Russell's substantive
arguments regarding compliance with the Trust terms and intent).
B.

Russell's "community property" argument is raised for the first time
on appeal, and fails in all events.
1.

This issue was not preserved in the district court

Russell also argues for the first time in this appeal that the farm was "community
properly" and that Eugene could therefore revoke the Trust himself under U.C.A. § 75-7605(2)(a) (2004). That statute provides: "[T]o the extent the trust consists of community
property, the trust may be revoked by either spouse acting alone but may be amended
only by joint action of both spouses." Id.
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Russell's "community property" argument, made in Part B.l of his brief, was
neither raised nor argued below. While § 75-7-605 was cited and discussed in the district
court, Russell did not argue subsection (2). (R.784 at 777.) His new argument under this
subsection should not be considered for the first time on appeal.
2.

The Utah farm was not held as "community property."

Even if this subsection had been raised below, this argument fails on its face.
Utah is not a community property state. See Englert v. Englert, 576 P.2d 1274, 1275
(Utah 1978). "Only nine states have community-property systems: Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin." Black's
Law Dictionary 21A (7th ed. 1999). Eugene and Zelma were residents of Utah. (R. 153.)
The farm is situated in Utah. (R. 17.) Russell's citation to law from California - a
community property state - is unavailing. (Aplt. Br. at 22-23.) The real property in
question is not "community property." The statute therefore does not apply.
In addition, this Court may affirm on any ground supported by the record. As
already noted, § 75-7-605, enacted in 2004 as part of the Trust Code, does not apply to
the execution of the deed in 2001. See supra part I. A. Because this statute does not
apply to acts preceding the adoption of the Code, it does not control even if the property
in question were "community property." See U.C.A. § 75-7-1103(3).

366159v.4

35

C.

Russell's "failure to serve55 argument is raised for the first time on
appeal, and fails in all events.
1.

This issue was not preserved in the district court

Lastly, Russell never made the claim in the district court that he currently makes
in Part B.2 of his brief. He now argues that, because of mental incompetence, Zelma
"failed to serve" as a trustee under paragraph 3.01 of the Trust on January 1, 2001, and
could therefore be replaced by Eugene. (Aplt. Br. at 23-24.) Russell argued below,
however, that Zelma was competent to make appropriate decisions about disposing of her
property as late as 2003. (R.235, 243, 637-38; 784 at 775, 784-90.)
For an issue to be preserved for appeal, "(1) the issue must be raised in a timely
fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, ^ 15, 127 P.3d
1256. Whether Zehna's mental state constituted a "failure to serve" as a trustee under the
terms of the Trust, or whether she failed to undertake any particular duty as trustee, was
simply not addressed by the trial court. No finding to this effect was made because
Russell never raised it. This is not a proper appeal ground.
2.

This factual argument is not supported by a marshaling of the
evidence and is contrary to the evidence and the district courVs
findings.

Russell bases his "failure to serve" argument on selective evidence of Zelma's
mental condition at certain times, even though at trial he argued that Zelma was fully
competent at all relevant times. (R.637-38; 784 at 784-90.) The trial court found with
respect to Zelma's mental condition that, while she experienced periodic moments of
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clarity, under all the circumstances she was incompetent to sign the quitclaim deed on
March 21, 2003, less than ten days after suffering the trauma of losing her husband of
more than sixty years. (R.784 at 861-65.) The trial court made no finding, however, that
she was unfit to serve as a trustee when Eugene executed the quitclaim deed on January
1, 2001.
Ample evidence in fact existed to the contrary, including evidence admitted by
Russell in support of his trial theory that Zelma was competent on that date. See supra
pp. 13-14 (collating record evidence of Zelma's competence); R.782 at 295; 783 at 386.
This Court will not act as a second-chance fact finder, sifting and weighing the evidence
to reach a different factual outcome. See Search v. Union Pac. R.R., 649 P.2d 48, 50
(Utah 1982). This is especially true where Russell has not challenged any fact finding or
marshaled the evidence. See supra Part LB.
In sum, Russell's principal arguments are raised on appeal for the first time. The
Court should not consider them. The result is that his arguments in all of Part A and in
Parts B. 1 and B.2 of his brief should be rejected and the decision affirmed on those
grounds. Alternatively, as shown in this Part II and further in Part III infra, Russell's
new arguments fail on their merits in all events.
III.

Assuming Russell has properly preserved and raised his appellate challenges,
the district court's order should be affirmed on its merits because, as a matter
of fact and law, the grantors did not revoke the Trust with respect to the
farm.
In this appeal, Russell has abandoned any argument that Zelma's "mark" was

effective to complete a revocation via the quitclaim deed. (R.636-37; Aplt. Br. at 10-11.)
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Instead, he argues only that Eugene's signature, made alone in January 2001, was
sufficient by itself to revoke. (Aplt. Br. at 11-30.) Assuming, arguendo, that Russell has
properly raised and preserved his appellate challenges to the district court's orders, the
decision below is correct as a matter of fact and law and should be affirmed.
The trial court's application of law to the facts of this case "is best viewed as a
mixed question of fact and law." Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, f 9, 144 P.3d 1147.
The trial found facts and from those facts determined the outcome of the legal dispute.
See id; Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,ffi[76-78, 100 P.3d 1177. The evidence was
heavily disputed. (R.782-84.) Thus, while the law itself is subject to a correctness
review, any legal determinations flowing from the application of that law to the facts of
this case are reviewed with "deference to the trial court's application of law to the facts."
Wayment, 2006 UT 56, | 9. Moreover, because the issues here are extremely fact
dependent, the appellate court grants "broad deference" to the trial court. Id. "In
addition, when appealing a highly fact dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to
marshal the evidence." Id. Russell's appeal fails when these standards are applied.
"A trust is an arrangement for the ownership of property [where] legal title of the
property is held by the trustee, but the benefit and enjoyment of the property resides with
the beneficiaries." Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17, ^j 11, 71 P.3d 589.
"In interpreting the terms of a trust, the proper focus of inquiry is the settlor's intent."
Flake, 2003 UT 17, f 13, 71 P.3d 589 (quoting Leggroan v. lion's Sav. Bank & Trust
Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749 (1951)). When extrinsic evidence of intent is considered, the
question is one of fact. See Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985).
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""Absent fraud or mistake, a settlor "has the power to modify a trust only if and to
the extent that such a power was reserved by the terms of the trust.'"" Hoggan v.
Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, ] 9 (quoting Flake, 2003 UT 17, \ 13 (quoting Kline v. Utah Dep 7
of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App. 1989))); accord Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, \ 9,
52 P.3d 1190; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331 (1959). "If the settlor reserves a
power to modify the trust only in a particular manner or under particular circumstances,
he can modify the trust only in that manner or under those circumstances." Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 331, cmt. d. It is only when no method is specified that a grantor or
grantors may resort to "any method which sufficiently manifests his [or her] intention."
Id, cmt. c. "Revocation requires an express statement and cannot be accomplished
through implication." 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trusts § 76.
These well-established rules are based on the underlying legal premise that when
property is placed in a legal trust, title is divested from the settlor and vested in the trust
and the trustees. Flake, 2003 UT 17,1J11. "The trustee has exclusive control of the trust
properly, subject only to the limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument, and 'once
the settlor has created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property and has
only such ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument.'"
Id. (quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632
P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981)).
Based on these governing principles, and in light of the extensive evidentiary
record adduced at trial, the district court's rulings were correct as a matter of fact and
law.
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A.

Eugene and Zelma did not revoke the Trust with respect to the
farm, nor did they intend to do so.

Eugene acted as trustee, not grantor, in signing the deed. (R. 17, 739, 784 at 85456.) Because a trustee had no power to revoke the Trust, Russell's revocation argument
fails for this reason alone. (R. 153-59, 739.)
Furthermore, the Trust required the signatures of both grantors to consent to
revocation. Paragraph 2.01(a) of the Trust provides:
While either Grantor is living, the trust created by this instrument may be
revoked, in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by the Grantors, or
the survivor of them, and delivered to the Trustees. Upon revocation, the
Trustees shall promptly distribute to Grantors, or the survivor of them, all
of the designated portion of the property comprising the trust estate.
(R. 153-54.)
Zelma and Eugene were both grantors under the Trust. (R. 153.) At the time
Eugene executed the quitclaim deed, Zelma was living but did not sign the instrument.
(R. 17, 782 at 174.) Accordingly, the quitclaim deed could not constitute a valid
revocation because it did not comply with the express provisions of the Trust. See Kline,
776 P.2d at 661. The trial court properly ruled, therefore, that "the deed . . . is invalid to
revoke the Trust because . . . [it] was not signed by both Grantors as required by
paragraph 2.01(a) of the Trust." (R.739.) The signing by one grantor instead of two did
not comply - strictly, substantially, or otherwise - with the revocation provisions of the
Trust. See, e.g., Guardian State Bank, 834 P.2d at 607-08 (omission of required
signature cannot qualify as substantial compliance).
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The Trust specified the method required for revocation. The Trust required a twostep process: signature by both grantors followed by trustee distribution to both grantors.
(R. 153-54.) Russell argues it would be unnecessary for the trustees to deliver the deed to
themselves. (Aplt. Br. at 16-17.) Even countenancing Russell's argument, there is no
evidence of Zelma's involvement with Eugene's signing in 2001. Nor does Russell
identify any, except to argue that Eugene acted for Zelma - a factual argument the district
court specifically rejected. (R.784 at 836-45; see also infra part III.C, discussing same).
Moreover, Russell has not appealed the district court's unchallenged factual
findings that Eugene and Zelma did not intend either to transfer the farm without
consideration or to revoke the Trust thereby. (R.784 at 840-58.) Thus, all other
arguments aside, affirmance is required.
In sum, Eugene and Zelma did not revoke the Trust, in whole or in part, nor did
they intend to do so.
B.

Eugene could not effect a transfer out of the Trust as a trustee in
violation of the terms of the Trust, nor did he intend to do so.

Eugene could not properly transfer the farm as trustee without fair consideration.
Paragraph 2.02 of the Trust provides:
2.02 Distribution of Income and Principal. While either Grantor is
living, the Trustee shall hold, manage, invest, and reinvest the trust
estate, collect the income therefrom and pay to Grantors, or to the
survivor of them, all, none, or such part of the net income and principal
of the trust estate as the Grantors may determine to be necessary for
their medical care, maintenance, support, and reasonable comfort in
their accustomed manner of living.
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(R. 154.) The word "shall" as used here is mandatory. See Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525
P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974).
A transfer of Trust property without fair consideration would directly contravene
the stated purposes of the Trust. The Trust required the trustees to "hold, manage, invest,
and reinvest the trust estate" to provide for the grantors' "medical care, maintenance,
support, and reasonable comfort in their accustomed manner of living." (R.154.) The
trial court properly found in this case that this explicit purpose would be undermined by
the disposal of the major Trust asset without fair consideration, and that to do so would
violate the Trustee's fiduciary duties under the Trust. See In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d
351, 355 (Utah 1997) (trustee's power to dispose of Trust asset circumscribed by the
trustee's fiduciary duty).
Specifically, the trial court found that "fair value is required to satisfy the terms of
the trust" and that paragraph 2.01 provided a "clear expression that will preclude either or
both trustee acting in the capacity of a trustee to convey a gift." (R.740, 784 at 832.)
This determination is supported by the language of the Trust and the evidence introduced
at trial. (R.782 at 119, 131, 289-90; Trial Ex. 10.) Russell maintained below that this
issue presented a question of fact. (R.659.5.)
Utah law holds:
It is well settled that [a] trust... is a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held [the
trustee] to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person [the beneficiary], which arises as a result of a manifestation [by the settlor,
or trustor] of an intention to create it.
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Flake, 2003 UT 17, ^ 11 (brackets in original). A trustee's "power is circumscribed by
the trustee's 'obligation as a fiduciary,' which requires that 'except as otherwise provided
by the terms of the trust, a trustee shall observe standards in dealing with the trust assets
that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the property of another." In re
Estate of West, 948 P.2d at 355 (citations omitted). Eugene was a trustee and therefore
owed fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries of the Trust, including Zelma. (R. 153.) Thus,
Eugene had an obligation to manage the Trust property in a prudent manner that
complied with the purposes of the Trust.
Gifting the farm would clearly violate those duties, as it was the primary asset
belonging to the Trust. (R.784 at 656-59.) This is especially true where Zelma's
precarious health and finances depended on the use of the Trust assets for her support.
See supra p. 13 (collating evidence of same). Accordingly, the trial court was correct to
rule that:
Any trustee who acts must also act in recognition of the rights and duties
that they hold and obligations they have to the other trustee. And in this
case [Eugene] had an obligation to act in recognition of the duty owed to
[Zelma] and he could not unilaterally transfer the property in violation of
the provisions of the trust which set forth the purpose of the trust.
(R.784 at 845.)
Russell argues that the quitclaim deed rendered the purpose of the Trust irrelevant
because it revoked the Trust. (Aplt. Br. at 20-22.) This circular argument would
eliminate any duty to comply with the express purposes of a trust or the fiduciary duties
imposed by a trust, because any purported disposal of trust property would revoke the
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purposes and fiduciary duties of the trust. This argument is bad policy. It is not and
should not be the law.
Finally, the trial court found that Eugene did not intend to transfer the property out
of the Trust without consideration or to revoke the Trust by any such transfer. (R.784 at
836-56.) These unchallenged findings require affirmance regardless of any other
argument Russell has made. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1J 86, 100 P.3d 1177.
In sum, Eugene could not and did not transfer the Trust property as trustee. Nor,
as the district court found, did he intend to do so.
C.

Zelma's power of attorney did not authorize Eugene to dispose
of Trust property on his own, nor did Eugene intend to act
pursuant to that power.

The trial court found from the evidence that (1) Eugene did not sign for Zelma
when he executed the quitclaim deed, and (2) Eugene was not authorized to sign for her
in a fiduciary or trust capacity. (R.784 at 836-56.) Assuming these decisions are
appropriate for appellate review, they should be affirmed. The law and the facts confirm
both determinations.
1.

Zelma 9s power of attorney did not authorize Eugene to dispose of
Trust property on his own.

Russell's proffered construction of Zelma's power of attorney is contrary to the
express provisions of the Trust. The Trust specifically requires both grantors to consent
to revocation of the Trust. (R. 153-54.) Russell's power-of-attorney argument would
circumvent that explicit Trust requirement.
The trial court properly rejected this argument:
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[T]he durable power of attorney did not grant [Eugene] power to function
as a trustee unless it specifically said so . . . There's nothing inherent in that
grant of power to act which would enable them to act in the capacity of a
trustee because a trustee is selected and the powers are designated by the
settlor or grantor. . . I don't think that giving somebody a durable power of
attorney allows them to act in their fiduciary capacity [as trustee].
(R.784 at 836.)
The case law confirms the correctness of the district court's decision. In the case
law Russell cites, the power of attorney specifically authorized the agent to make
decisions concerning the principal's interests in trusts. See In re Schlagel Trust, 51 P.3d
1094, 1095-96 (Colo. App. 2002). In Schlagel, for example, the trial court made just
such a finding after a hearing that included evidence of the parties' intent outside the
documents; and the court of appeals affirmed. See id. at 1094, 1096 (construing power of
attorney "in light of the surrounding circumstances."). Russell's other cases are similarly
distinguishable. See In re Mosteller, 719 A.2d 1067 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (applying
statute requiring consideration of principal's ultimate intent, but distinguishing common
law outcome); First Union Natl Bank v. Thomas, Chancery No. 94-141 (Vir. Cir. Ct.
1995) (holding revocation power existed with respect to trust when power of attorney
specifically said so).
The power of attorney in this case did not provide Eugene with authority to
exercise Zelma's trustee power, whose status as a trustee was invoked by the typewritten
contents of the quitclaim deed. (R.784 at 836-56.) Nor do the surrounding circumstances
evidence such an intention: to the contrary, they evidence no such intention. (R.782 at
72, 110-13; 784 at 836-56.)
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This conclusion ultimately makes good policy sense. If the effect of an act would
be to breach a fiduciary duty and violate the express purposes of a trust - as the trial court
found here - then accomplishing that same act by a different avenue would have the same
effect. See WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,1j 26, 54 P.3d
1139 (courts look to substance of transactions rather than form). The district court's
application of law to fact on this record is appropriate and should be sustained.
2.

Eugene did not intend to revoke the Trust on his own.

Even if Zelma's power of attorney did authorize Eugene to act for her, the trial
court found, as a matter of fact, that Eugene did not intend to act in Zelma's behalf when
he executed the quitclaim deed. (R.784 at 836.) Key to the district court's finding was
the fact that Eugene signed only once and only in his own name. (R.784 at 836.) This
contrasts sharply with cases cited by Russell in which the exercise of the power of
attorney on another's behalf is abundantly apparent. See, e.g., In re Schlagel Trust, 51
P.3d at 1094 (document signed "by Jake Schlagel, Jr., Attorney-in-Fact and Agent under
Power of Attorney"); Kahn v. Royal Banks, 790 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Miss. App. 1990)
(husband signed his own andhis wife's name to promissory notes).
The trial court's factual determination is consistent with the overwhelming
evidence introduced in this case, and it has not been appealed. The relevant factual
findings include the facts that: (1) only Eugene signed the deed; (2) a gift of Trust
property would be inconsistent with and precluded by the provisions of the Trust and the
fiduciary duties of the trustee; and (3) Eugene did not intend to give Russell the farm as a
gift. (R.739-40; 784 at 832, 846-58.)
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Russell contends that Eugene's signature was binding on Zelma even though
Eugene did not purport to act as Zelma's representative. (Aplt. Br. at 29.) The authority
Russell cites stands for the opposite conclusion. The statute he identifies provides that "if
the form of the agent's signature does not show unambiguously that the signature is made
in a representative capacity, or the represented party is not identified in the instrument,
the representative is liable on the instrument." U.C.A. § 70A-3-402(2)(b). The effect of
that statute is to bind an agent who executes an instrument, not the unsigning principal.
Finally, ample evidence in the record supports the district court's factual findings
of intent, far beyond what Russell has raised or argued. (R.782-84; see supra pp. 8-18.)
In sum, the district court's findings regarding the effect of the quitclaim deed are
correct as a matter of fact and law. This Court should affirm.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, individually and collectively, the order of the district
court setting aside the quitclaim deed as void ab initio should be affirmed in all respects.

366159v.4

47

DATED this 9"' day of October, 2007.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

By: _J
—
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Roosevelt, Utah 84066
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Steven R. Davis, Trustee of the Eugene Davis and
Zelma B. Davis Living Trust
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STEVEN R. DAVIS, as Trustee of
the EUGENE DAVIS AND ZELMA B.
DAVIS LIVING TRUST,

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
RUSSELL E. YOUNG and PATRICIA
ANN ZUFELT,

CASE NO. 030800039
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the following motions in
limine, asking the Court for rulings on the law and the application of the law to undisputed facts:
1. Defendant Russell Young's "Motion in Limine,
ary 16, 2006;

filed Febru-

2. Plaintiff's "Motion in Limine: Is it Possible Under the
Terms of the Davis Family Trust for a Gift to be Made of
One of the Assets of the Trust," filed February 10, 2006;
3. Plaintiff's "Motion in Limine for this Court to Declare the
Process for Transfer of Property from the Davis Family
Trust," filed February 10, 2006;
4. Plaintiff's "Motion in Limine: A Determination that in Order to Transfer Property from a Trust Trust Law and the
Trust Instrument Govern Such Transfer," filed February 10,
2006;

5. Plaintiff's "Motion in Limine: A Determination that Trust
Property is Owned by the Trust and is No Longer the Property of the Settlors/' filed February 10, 2006;
6. Plaintiff's "Motion in Limine: A Determination that the
Burden of Proof on the Issue of Undue Influence Belongs to
the Defendants," filed March 13, 2006;
The Court entertained argument on these motions at a hearing
held on June 26, 2006. Having reviewed the motions and argument
on the motions, the Court now rules upon the motions.
I. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS:
1. In 1993, Eugene and Zelma Davis created the "Eugene Davis
and Zelma B. Davis Family Living Trust" (hereinafter "the
Trust" or "the Davis Trust");
2. The Davis Trust names Mr. Eugene Davis and Mrs. Zelma
Davis (hereinafter "Mr. Davis" and "Mrs. Davis") as the
trustees and the sole beneficiaries during their lifetimes. Upon the death of the survivor of them, the Trust
provides for a $1,000.00 cash distribution to each of six
named grandchildren (of which the Defendant Russell Young
is one). The Trust then divides the remaining trust assets into three equal parts: one-third to Steven R.
Davis, who is the named trustee of the Trust in this action; one-third to Patricia Ann Zufelt, a Defendant in
this action; and one-third to be divided equally between
Rex and Fay Davis;
3. Mr. and Mrs. Davis, acting as grantors1 of the Trust,
lawfully deeded the subject property to the trustees of
the Trust on December 02, 1993, which deed was recorded
December 13, 1993;
4. On January 01, 2001, Mr. Davis executed a quit claim
deed, conveying the subject property to Defendant Russell
Young (hereinafter "Mr. Young") for ten dollars. The
deed was executed under the names "Eugene and Zelma B
The Court uses grantor(s) and settlor (s) interchangeably in this ruling.

Davis Trustees" and was signed "Eugene Davis Trustee.
Mrs. Davis did not sign the deed at this time;
5. On March 12, 2003, Mr. Davis died, leaving Mrs. Davis as
the remaining survivor under the terms of the Trust;
6. On March 21, 2003, nine days after the death of her husband and three days after her husband's funeral, Mrs.
Davis purportedly2 added her name to the same quit claim
deed executed by Mr. Davis on January 01, 2001;
7. Mr. Young admits that he had a close relationship with
his grandparents (Mr. and Mrs. Davis). Complaint, p. 3,
SI 12 (filed July 02, 2003); Young's Answer, p. 3, SI 12
(filed July 30, 2003) . Mr. Young further admits that, at
the time Mrs. Davis signed the deed, he had a confidential relationship with Mrs. Davis and that, at that same
time, Mrs. Davis was susceptible to undue influence.
Complaint, p. 5, SI SI 34-35; Young's Answer, p. 5, SISI 3435.
8. Although in dispute, it is material for purposes of the
Court's ruling on the motions in limine that the Plaintiff claims that Mrs. Davis lacked the capacity to dispose of property at the time she signed the deed.
II. THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE DAVIS TRUST:
1. "2.01 Powers Reserved by Grantors, (a) Revocation. While
either grantor is living, the trust created by this instrument may be revoked, in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by Grantors, or the survivor of them, and
delivered to the Trustees. Upon revocation, the Trustees
shall promptly distribute to Grantors, or the survivor of
them, all of the designated portion of the property comprising the trust estate."

2

The Court says "purportedly" due to the fact that the mark on the deed is
unreadable and does not appear to be a signature. The mark is, however, notarized, indicating that it is the signature of Zelma Davis. That said,
there is no indication from the deed that the mark was made by Mrs. Davis
acting as a grantor of the Trust.

2 . " 2 . 01 Powers Reserved by Grantors. (c) Scope of Powers.
The powers reserved by Grantors under this Article 2.01
are exercisable in the absolute discretion of Grantors
and, except in conditions of mental incapacity (mental in
capacity being established by written certification of
mental incapacity by two physicians who are not beneficiaries and are not spouses, children or siblings of beneficiaries of this trust), neither the Trustees nor any
beneficiary hereunder shall have any right or power to
enforce or object to the exercise of such powers."
3. "2.02 Distribution of Income and Principle. While either
Grantor is living, the Trustee shall hold, manage, invest, and reinvest the trust estate, collect the income
therefrom and pay to Grantors, or to the survivor of
them, all, none, or such part of the net income and principal of the trust estate as the Grantors may determine
to be necessary for their medical care, maintenance, support, and reasonable comfort in their accustomed manner
of living."
4. Upon the death of the survivor of Mr. and Mrs. Davis, the
Trust was to be distributed: $1,000.00 each to six named
grandchildren and the remainder was to be divided onethird to Steven R. Davis, one-third to Patricia Ann
Zufelt, one-sixth to Rex Davis, and one-sixth to Fay
Davis. See Trust, SI 2.04.
5. "5.02 Administrative Powers of Trustee. Trustee is
authorized and empowered to exercise all powers granted
to Trustees generally by Utah law."
6. "7.01 Governing Law. All questions as to the validity
and construction of this instrument and of all trusts
created by this instrument shall be interpreted by to
Utah law."
III. THE RELEVANT LAW:
1. The general rule of law is that "revocation requires an
express statement and cannot be accomplished through implication." 76 Am. Jur. 2d TRUSTS, § 76.

2. The general rule of law is that "if the settlor reserves
a power to modify the trust only in a particular manner
or under particular circumstances, he can modify the
trust only in that manner or under those circumstances"
and "the same rule applies to a settlor's power to revoke
a trust." Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, SI13 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 331, cmt. d) . Further, "if the
settlor reserves a power to revoke the trust only by a
notice in writing delivered to the trustee, he can revoke
it only by delivering such a notice to the trustee." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330,

cmt.

j.

3. "In interpreting the terms of a trust, the proper focus
of inquiry is the settlor's intent." Flake, 2003 UT 17,
3113 (citing Leggroan v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232
P.2d 746, 749 (1951)).
4. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3) provides:
"The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in
the terms of the trust; or
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or
the method provided in the terms is not expressly made
exclusive, by:
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or specifically devises property that
would otherwise have passed according to the terms of the
trust; or
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing
evidence of the settlor's intent."
5. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(4) provides:
"Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall
deliver the trust property as the settlor directs."

IV. DISCUSSION:
Having outlined what the Court views as the relevant undisputed facts, relevant provisions of the Trust, and relevant legal authority for purposes of ruling upon the parties' respective motions in limine, the Court will now specifically address
the key issues raised by the various motions in limine.
A. THE POWER TO REVOKE THE TRUST
Paragraph 2.01(a) dictates the manner whereby the Davis
Trust was to be revoked and a distribution of assets made. It
requires a written instrument, signed by the grantors (or the
survivor of them) and delivered to the trustees. Only after
that instrument is delivered can the trustee make a distribution .
Mr. Young argues that "[a] trustee, who is also the beneficiary, may sell or dispose of [] property as he or she sees
fit." Young's Trial Brief, p. 4 (filed February 16, 2006). In
support of this proposition, the Defendant cites two Utah cases
-- West v. West, 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997) and Perrenoud v. Harman, 2000 UT App 241. Upon review of these cases, the Court is
convinced that they are readily distinguishable from the case
before the Court. In both West and Perrenoud, the written trust
contained a specific direction as to how the trust could be revoked. See West, 948 P.2d at 354; see Perrenoud, 2000 UT App
241, 59. Indeed, the holding in each of these cases relied upon
the explicit language of the respective trust documents, which
specifically granted to the trustee a power to sell or dispose
of property in the trust. The Davis Trust does not grant any
similar power to the trustee. On the contrary, the Davis Trust
reserves solely to the settlors the power to revoke and upon
revocation the trustee was obligated to convey the property to
the settlors (or the survivor of them).
In addition to the above, and of particular importance to
the Court in determining that West and Perrenoud are not controlling in the instant case, is the following. Each of the two
cases identify three necessary factors which determine whether a

trustee has power to make a distribution of trust assets, only
the first of which need be addressed by this Court. The first
factor is: does the trust authorize the trustee to revoke the
trust by selling or encumbering the trust res. See West, 948
P.2d at 353; see Perrenoud, 2000 UT App 241, SI 8. In the context of this case, the question is whether the terms of the
trust or Utah law provide the trustee with the power to revoke
the trust by executing a deed to a third party. The unavoidable
answer is that neither the trust nor Utah law authorizes such a
revocation. Therefore, because the first requisite factor outlined in these two cases has not been met, these cases do not
control the issue before the Court.
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear to the Court that the
position the Defendants have taken on revocation is not supported by the general rules of law which apply to revocation of
trusts (see Section III "The Relevant Law," SI 2 above), Utah
statute (see Section III "The Relevant Law," SI 4 above), nor the
West and Perrenoud cases.
B. MENTAL INCAPACITY AND BURDEN OF PROOF:
The Defendants rely on the Trust provision of paragraph
2.01(c) (which requires that mental incapacity be established by
written certification of mental incapacity by two physicians) to
support their claim that this Court cannot receive evidence of
incapacity other than the written certification of two physicians. There is, however, no requirement that the physicians
have any particular training or that they have personally made
the determination of incapacity. Nor is there any time limit
for presenting the certification or any direction as to whom
shall determine the sufficiency of the certification. Because
neither Grantor survives, parole evidence as to intent is unavailable. However, it is clear that the Grantors of the Davis
Trust intended that no Grantor exercise the power of revocation
while mentally incapacitated.
This is of particular concern in this case because a confidential relationship between Mr. Young and his grandparents existed at time periods which are relevant to these proceedings.
As a result of the confidential nature of this relationship,

Utah law makes clear that Mr. Young will bear the burden of establishing that the confidential relationship was not abused by
undue influence, which is presumed in such relationships. Baker
v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984). Assuming for the sake
of argument that Mrs. Davis was mentally incapacitated, that
fact would have a significant effect on the Court's determination of whether or not a confidential relationship was abused.
It appears to the Court that mental capacity is always an issue
in considering whether the presumption of undue influence has
been overcome. Therefore, regardless of the direction in the
Trust, mental capacity will be an issue which the Court must
consider in determining whether the Defendant has met his burden .
If the burden is not met, the presumption will remain and
the Court will be compelled to set aside the conveyance. Whatever limitations the Trust may place on the process for determining capacity, the Trust cannot limit the Court's power to receive evidence as to the issue of whether the Defendants can
overcome the presumption of undue influence. However, in reading the Trust, the Court believes that the Grantors were more
concerned that a mentally incapacitated grantor not exercise the
powers reserved to the Grantors, than the method of proving incapacity. In order to give effect to this intent, the Court
will consider all forms of evidence (including, but not solely
limited to, written certification of mental incapacity issued by
physicians).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the foregoing, the Court rules that:
1. Mr. Young has admitted the existence of a confidential
relationship with Mrs. Davis at the time she purportedly
signed the deed on March 21, 2003 (see Young's Answer, p.
5, SI 34), and "where a confidential relationship exists,
a presumption of unfairness arises which must be overcome
by countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the
defendant to prove absence of unfairness by a preponderance of the evidence." Baker, 684 P.2d at 636.

2. Mr. Young, as grantee of the deed and the individual who
shared the confidential relationship with the Grantor,
will bear the burden of overcoming the presumption of undue influence;
3. If Mr. Young cannot overcome this burden, the deed will
fail;
4. The Court will entertain evidence on the issue of the
mental capacity of Mrs. Davis in considering whether Mr.
Young has met his burden of proof;
5. Absent additional evidence, the deed (signed by Mr. Davis
on January 01, 2001, and later purportedly signed by Mrs.
Davis on March 21, 2003) is invalid to revoke the Trust
because:
a. On January 01, 2001, the deed was not signed by both
Grantors as required by paragraph 2.01(a) of the
Trust; the deed was signed only by Mr. Davis at that
time;
b. On January 01, 2001, the deed was signed by Mr. Davis
in his capacity as trustee; the Trust requires revocation by both "Grantors";
c. The terms of the Trust require a separate instrument
which specifically revokes the Trust; only after that
instrument is executed by both Grantors (or the survivor of them) can the trustee distribute property back
to the Grantors for the Grantors to do with as they
please. In this case, neither the deed as it existed
on January 01, 2001, nor as it existed on March 21,
2003, complies with these provisions, therefore, the
deed cannot be considered an instrument which revokes
the Trust. Further, the deed does not substantially
comply with the provisions of the Trust (see Utah Code
Ann. § 75-7-605(3)(a)) nor does it manifest a clear
and convincing intent to revoke the Trust (see Utah
Code Ann. § 75-7-60 5(3)(b)(ii);

6. The deed as it existed on January 01, 2001, and on March
21, 2003, are invalid, except as they may be supported by
fair value received by the Trust. Fair value is required
to satisfy the terms of the Trust which designate that
the purpose of the Trust is to provide for the "necessary
medical care, maintenance, support, and reasonable comfort in [the grantors] accustomed manner of living."
Davis Trust, 5 2.02. A gift is inconsistent with this
purpose. Assuming the deed does not affect a revocation,
to allow a gift would effectively amend paragraph 2.02 to
add "making gifts" as a purpose of the Trust. However,
it is clear from the language of the Trust that amendments must be made in the same manner as revocation.
Therefore, the deed cannot amend the Trust.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant Young's "Motion in Limine" is denied to the extent it seeks to preclude the Court from hearing evidence
on mental capacity. The Court will, however, abide by
Rule of Evidence 403 prohibiting the presentation of cumulative evidence;
2. Trust property may be transferred only to provide for the
support of the Grantors. Therefore, because a gift does
not provide such support, a gift is not authorized under
the original terms of the Trust;
3. The Trust may only be modified or revoked by a separate
writing which: specifies an intent to modify or revoke
the trust, sets forth the modification or revocation
terms, and is signed by the Grantors (or the survivor of
them). The deed to Mr. Young is not sufficient to modify
or revoke the Trust;
4. Due to the close relationship between Mr. Young and Mrs.
Davis, a confidential relationship exists. Mr. Young

will bear the burden of proof to overcome the presumption
of undue influence;
5. In considering the issue of undue influence, the Court
may consider the capacity of Mrs. Davis at the time that
she signed the deed. The language of the Trust specifying that capacity should be determined by the written
certification of two physicians is not binding on the
Court in determining the issue of undue influence. This
trust language does not purport to apply to the issue of
undue influence. Therefore, the Court will allow the
parties to present any relevant evidence which goes to
the issue of undue influence, including evidence as to
Mrs. Davis' capacity;
6. In construing the language of the Trust, the Court believes that the primary intent of the Grantors was to
prevent a mentally incapacitated grantor from modifying
or revoking the Trust. Any reasonable interpretation of
the Trust terms which further this intent should be
adopted. The interpretation urged by Mr. Young could
easily allow an incapacitated grantor to amend or revoke
the Trust. Such would be the situation in all cases
where there was clear incapacity but where that incapacitated grantor had not been examined by two physicians.
Even if the required physicians certify incapacity, the
Trust is silent on what qualifications the physicians
must possess, what is required for an evaluation (if any)
leading to the certification of incapacity, who (if anyone) may review the sufficiency of any evaluations, and
the standard for that review. Arguably, two physicians
not qualified to diagnose mental capacity, who never actually examined Mrs. Davis, could file written certification of Mrs. Davis' mental incapacity even at this time.
Given all of this uncertainty, the Court chooses to follow a course which will give the Grantors' intent predominance. This is accomplished not by limiting the
means to prove incapacity, but by allowing any relevant
evidence of capacity to be received and reviewed by the
Court. This is the course most likely to prevent the

acts of an incapacitated grantor, which was certainly the
intent of the original Grantors.
Dated this

day of

ifo^frff'

2006

BY THE COURT:

A. LYNN TAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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Cleve J. Hatch (5609)
Attorney for Steven R. and Rex E. Davis
P.O. Box 1613
Roosevelt, Utah 84066
Telephone: 435-781-9371

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DUCHESNE
COUNTY STATE OF UTAH, DUCHESNE DEPARTMENT

STEVEN R. DAVIS as trustee of the
EUGENE DAVIS AND ZELMA B.DAVIS
LIVING TRUST, AND REX E. DAVIS,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

Vs.
RUSSELL E. YOUNG, and
PATRICIA ANN ZUFELT,
Defendants.

Case number 030800039
Judge A. Lynn Payne

COMES NOW THIS COURT AND ISSUES THE FOLLOWING ORDER:
The Document titled Quit Claim Deed
Signed by Eugene Davis January 1,2001,
Signed by Zelma Davis March 21, 2003,
Recorded March 24, 2003,
And bearing the entry, book and page number E 360625 B A3 91 P 656
Is hereby set aside,
The Quit Claim Deed is void and of no effect ab initio.

Order Davis etalv

Young et al 030800039

BY THE COURT
DATED this

day of October, 2006.

/// / J0
Jfarrpedafiudge'sdirection

T x
Judge
A. Lynn Payn^

By.
Approved as to form

Evan Schmutz attorney for

Cindy Barton-Coombs attorney for

Russell Young

Patricia Zufelt
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order,
postage prepaid to Evan Schmutz Hill, Johnson & Schmutz, L.C., Jamestown Square
Suite 200, 3319 North University Avenue, Provo, Utah 84604, and to Cindy BartonCoombs, 193 North State Street, Roosevelt, Utah 84066, this—> day of October, 2006.

Cleve J. Hatch
NOTICE OF INTENT TO SUBMIT FOR SIGNATURE
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned attorney for Plaintiffs will submit the
Order to the District Court Judge, ten days from the date of service of this Notice, unless
a written objection is filed priorjp that time pursuant to rule 7 (f)(2) of the Utah Rules of
/
Civil Procedure. Dated this „ , t S day of October, 2006. ^ j
/
^_

( ( ^
Cleve Hatch
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U.C.A. § 75-7-605(2) (2004)
(2)

If a revocable trust is created or funded by more than one settlor:
(a)

to the extent the trust consists of community property, the trust may
be revoked by either spouse acting alone but may be amended only
by joint action of both spouses; and

(b)

to the extent the trust consists of property other than community
property, each settlor may revoke or amend the trust with regard to
the portion of the trust property attributable to that settlor's
contribution.
U.C.A. § 75-7-605(3) (2004)

(3)

The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust:
(a)

by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of
the trust; or

(b)

if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method
provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by:
(i)

executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the
trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise
have passed according to the terms of the trust; or

(ii)

any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence
of the settlor's intent.
U.C.A. §75-7-816(2004)

(1)
When title to real property is granted to a person as trustee, the terms of the
trust may be given either
(a)

in the deed of transfer; or

(b)

in an instrument signed by the grantor and recorded in the same
office as the grant to the trustee.

(2)
If the terms of the trust are not made public as required in Subsection (1), a
conveyance from the trustee is absolute in favor of purchasers for value who take the
property without notice of the terms of the trust.
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(3)
The terms of the trust recited in the deed of transfer or the instrument
recorded under Subsection (l)(b) shall include:
(a)

the name of the trustee;

(b)

the address of the trustee; and

(c)

the name and date of the trust.
U.C.A. § 75-7-1103(n(a) (2004)

(1)

Except as otherwise provided, this chapter applies to:
(a)

all trusts created before, on, or after July 1, 2004 . . . .
U.C.A. §75-7-1103(3) (2004)

(3)
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An act done before July 1, 2004 is not affected by this chapter.

